Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the network to handle all our users, and running a Tor relay may help your anonymity.
However, many Tor users cannot be good relays — for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they can relay traffic.
Providing service to these clients is a critical part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients increases the size of the anonymity set.
That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining a relay.
We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past few years: Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and how much bandwidth it can offer.
There are four steps we need to address before we can do this though:
First, we still need to get better at automatically estimating the right amount of bandwidth to allow.
It might be that switching to UDP transport is the simplest answer here — which alas is not a very simple answer at all.
Second, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor users know about all Tor relays).
Perubahan seperti ini dapat menyebabkan dampak besar pada potensi dan anonimitas yang sebenarnya.
Lihat Bagian 5 dari halaman Tantangan untuk detailnya.
Sekali lagi, transportasi UDP akan membantu di sini.
Ketiga, kita perlu lebih memahami risiko dari membiarkan penyerang mengirim lalu lintas melalui relai Anda ketika Anda juga memulai lalu lintas anonim Anda sendiri.
Tiga different research dokumen menjelaskan cara untuk mengidentifikasi relai di sirkuit dengan menjalankan lalu lintas melalui kandidat relai dan mencari penurunan lalu lintas saat sirkuit aktif.
Serangan penyumbatan ini tidak terlalu menakutkan dalam konteks Tor selama relai juga tidak pernah menjadi klien.
But if we're trying to encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as bridge relays or as normal relays), then we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.
Fourth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes.
Berikut adalah pemikiran kami saat ini tentang insentif Tor.
Mohon bantu semua ini!